Decisions in Economics and Finance

, Volume 41, Issue 2, pp 219–237 | Cite as

Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource

  • Marta BiancardiEmail author
  • Lucia Maddalena


We study the exploitation of a common groundwater resource, first as a static and then as a differential game, in order to take into account the strategic and dynamic interactions among the users of the resource. We suppose that firms can form coalitions or can decide not to cooperate. The non-cooperation regime is characterized by pumping that lead to depletion of the aquifer; the cooperation preserves the resource. Open-loop and feedback equilibria have been computed and compared in order to characterize the existence of cooperators and defectors in water resources management.


Groundwater extraction Competition and cooperation Differential game 

JEL Classification

D62 D99 Q15 


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Copyright information

© Associazione per la Matematica Applicata alle Scienze Economiche e Sociali (AMASES) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FoggiaFoggiaItaly

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