Review of Economic Design

, Volume 22, Issue 3–4, pp 101–122 | Cite as

An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices

  • Ryuji SanoEmail author
Original Paper


This study analyzes the equilibrium of a core-selecting package auction under incomplete information. The ascending proxy auction of Ausubel and Milgrom (Front Theor Econ 1:1–42, 2002) is considered in a stylized environment with two goods, two local bidders, and one global bidder. Local bidders shade bids in the equilibrium because of the free-riding incentive. We examine the effect of reserve prices. We show that a reserve price for individual goods increases the equilibrium local bids, whereas they may be decreased by a reserve price for the package of goods. A flexible non-monotonic reserve price rule can improve allocative efficiency as well as seller revenue in the equilibrium.


Core-selecting auction Package auction Ascending proxy auction Reserve price 

JEL Classification

D44 D47 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsYokohama National UniversityYokohamaJapan

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