This study demonstrates the conditions under which an increase in the ambient charge positively or negatively affects the total level of non-point source pollutions. For this purpose, an n-firm Bertrand framework is used in which goods are differentiated and the corresponding price functions are linear. It is shown first that the effect is definitely negative in duopoly and triopoly and second that, for n\(> 4\), the sign of the effect depends on the number of the firms involved and the degree of substitutability.
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The authors highly acknowledge the financial supports from the MEXT-Supported Program for the Strategic Research Foundation at Private Universities 2013–2017, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), 16K03556 and 17k03712) add Chuo University (Joint Research Grant). The usual disclaimer applies.
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