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Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces

  • Trevor LeachEmail author
  • Robert C. Powers
Original Paper
  • 14 Downloads

Abstract

Fishburn (Aggregation and revelation of preferences. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 201–218, 1979) proved that majority rule on any proper permutation closed \(j\hbox {-rich}\) ballot space is the only social choice function satisfying faithfulness, consistency, cancellation, and neutrality. Alós-Ferrer (Soc Choice Welf 27:621–625, 2006) showed that neutrality was not needed for Fishburn’s result as long as the ballot space has no restriction on ballot sizes. In this paper, we show that the Alós-Ferrer result can be extended to a much larger class of ballot spaces.

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsUniversity of LouisvilleLouisvilleUSA

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