Condorcet winners and social acceptability

  • Muhammad Mahajne
  • Oscar VolijEmail author
Original Paper


We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals who rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner may not necessarily be socially acceptable. However, if preferences are single-peaked, single-dipped, or satisfy the single-crossing property, any Condorcet winner is socially acceptable. We identify maximal families of preferences that guarantee that Condorcet winners are socially acceptable.



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Univ. Lyon, UJM Saint-Etienne, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824Saint-ÉtienneFrance
  2. 2.Ben Gurion University of the NegevBeershebaIsrael

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