Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 53, Issue 4, pp 587–601 | Cite as

The possibility of Paretian anonymous decision-making with an infinite population

  • Susumu CatoEmail author
Original Paper


This paper considers the trade-off between unanimity and anonymity in collective decision-making with an infinite population. This efficiency-equity trade-off is afundamental difficulty in making a normative judgment in a conflict betweengenerations. In particular, it is known that this trade-off is quite sensitive in the formulation of unanimity axioms. In this study, we consider the trade-off in a preference-aggregation framework instead of the standard utility-aggregationframework. We show that there exists a social welfare function that satisfies I-strong Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and finite anonymity. This contrasts with an impossibility result in the standard utility-aggregation framework, and this means that the trade-off is also sensitive for background frameworks of aggregations.


Social choice Intergenerational equity Possibility theorem Unanimity Anonymity Ultrafilter 

JEL Classification

D63 D64 D71 



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social ScienceUniversity of TokyoTokyoJapan

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