Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 53, Issue 1, pp 113–134 | Cite as

Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization

  • Naoki YoshiharaEmail author
  • Akira Yamada
Original Paper


The present study examines production economies with unequal labor skills, where the planner is ignorant of the set of feasible allocations in advance of production. In particular, we characterize Nash implementation by canonical mechanisms by means of Maskin monotonicity and a new axiom, non-manipulability of unused skills (NUS), where the latter represents a weak independence property with respect to changes in skills. Following these characterizations, we show that some Maskin monotonic social choice correspondences are not implementable if information about individual skills is absent.



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Massachusetts AmherstAmherstUSA
  2. 2.School of ManagementKochi University of TechnologyKochi CityJapan
  3. 3.Institute of Economic ResearchHitotsubashi UniversityKunitachiJapan
  4. 4.School of Society and CollaborationSapporo UniversitySapporoJapan

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