Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval
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We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of Euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rules satisfying strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality is characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations by monotone voting.
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