Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 50, Issue 4, pp 581–596 | Cite as

Allocating group housing

  • Justin Burkett
  • Francis X. Flanagan
  • Amanda L. Griffith
Original Paper

Abstract

We study mechanisms for allocating objects to pairs of agents when agents may have nontrivial preferences over objects and pairings. In this environment, the mechanism may distort agents’ preferences over pairings. Compared to certain distortive mechanisms, a non-distortive one always has a stable allocation in our model, and selects stable outcomes that are ex ante preferred by all students under a regularity condition on the distribution of pair values.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Justin Burkett
    • 1
  • Francis X. Flanagan
    • 1
  • Amanda L. Griffith
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsWake Forest UniversityWinston-SalemUSA

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