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Journal of Mathematical Biology

, Volume 79, Issue 6–7, pp 2237–2253 | Cite as

Adaptive learning in large populations

  • Misha PerepelitsaEmail author
Article
  • 90 Downloads

Abstract

We consider the adaptive learning rule of Harley (J Theor Biol 89:611–633, 1981) for behavior selection in symmetric conflict games in large populations. This rule uses organisms’ past, accumulated rewards as the predictor for future behavior, and can be traced in many life forms from bacteria to humans. We derive a partial differential equation for the distribution of agents in the space of stimuli to select a particular strategy which describes the evolution of learning in heterogeneous populations. We analyze the solutions of the PDE model for symmetric \(2 \times 2\) games. It is found that in games with small residual stimuli, adaptive learning rules with larger memory factor converge faster to the optimal outcome.

Keywords

Adaptive learning Relative payoff sum Symmetric games 

Mathematics Subject Classification

35Q91 91A05 91A20 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the anonymous referees for patient reading of the manuscript and detailed comments that helped to improve it in so many ways.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsUniversity of HoustonHoustonUSA

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