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Theory of Computing Systems

, Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 114–127 | Cite as

An Almost Ideal Coordination Mechanism for Unrelated Machine Scheduling

  • Ioannis CaragiannisEmail author
  • Angelo Fanelli
Article
  • 44 Downloads
Part of the following topical collections:
  1. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2016)

Abstract

Coordination mechanisms aim to mitigate the impact of selfishness when scheduling jobs to different machines. Such a mechanism defines a scheduling policy within each machine and naturally induces a game among the selfish job owners. The desirable properties of a coordination mechanism includes simplicity in its definition and efficiency of the outcomes of the induced game. We present a broad class of coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling that are simple to define and we identify one of its members (mechanism DCOORD) that is superior to all known mechanisms. In particular, DCOORD induces potential games with logarithmic price of anarchy and only constant price of stability. Both bounds are almost optimal.

Keywords

Coordination mechanisms Potential games Price of anarchy Price of stability Scheduling Unrelated machines 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by Caratheodory grant E.114 from the University of Patras and by project ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 “CoCoRICo-CoDec” . Part of the work was done while the second author was visiting the Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore in 2015.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Engineering and InformaticsUniversity of PatrasRion-PatrasGreece
  2. 2.CNRS (UMR-6211)Université de Caen Basse-NormandieCaenFrance

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