Theory of Computing Systems

, Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 90–113 | Cite as

Price of Anarchy for Highly Congested Routing Games in Parallel Networks

  • Riccardo Colini-BaldeschiEmail author
  • Roberto Cominetti
  • Marco Scarsini
Part of the following topical collections:
  1. Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2016)


We consider nonatomic routing games with one source and one destination connected by multiple parallel edges. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we prove that under suitable conditions on the costs the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with some counterexamples that this is not always the case, and that these counterexamples already occur in simple networks with only 2 parallel links.


Nonatomic routing games Price of Anarchy Regularly varying functions Wardrop equilibrium Parallel networks High congestion 



Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi is a member of GNAMPA-INdAM. Roberto Cominetti gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of LUISS during a visit in which this research was initiated. Roberto Cominetti’s research is also supported by FONDECYT 1130564 and Núcleo Milenio ICM/FIC RC130003 “Información y Coordinación en Redes”. Marco Scarsini is a member of GNAMPA-INdAM. He gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of FONDECYT 1130564 and Núcleo Milenio “Información y Coordinación en Redes”.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dipartimento di Economia e FinanzaLUISSRomaItaly
  2. 2.Facultad de Ingeniería y CienciasUniversidad Adolfo IbáñezSantiagoChile

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