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Weak implementation

  • Kym PramEmail author
Research Article

Abstract

I define Weak Implementation under incomplete information. A social choice set is weakly implementable if the set of equilibrium outcomes of some mechanism is a non-empty subset of the social choice set. Weak implementation is a more natural objective than either full or partial implementation in many cases. I show that there are social choice sets where every subset can be weakly implemented, yet the set cannot be fully implemented. I give a complete characterization of the weakly implementable social choice sets under a weak restriction on preferences. As a corollary, I show that in independent private values environments the set of interim efficient social choice functions is weakly implementable whenever it is partially implementable.

Keywords

Implementation theory Mechanism design Game theory Full implementation 

JEL Classification

C72 D71 D80 D82 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Eddie Dekel, Jeff Ely, Alessandro Pavan and Asher Wolinsky for their invaluable support and feedback. I would also like to thank Chris Li, Matteo Foschi, and a seminar audience at Northwestern for their helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Nevada, RenoRenoUSA

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