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Economic Theory

, Volume 68, Issue 4, pp 907–934 | Cite as

Convergence results on stochastic adaptive learning

  • Naoki FunaiEmail author
Research Article

Abstract

We investigate an adaptive learning model which nests several existing learning models such as payoff assessment learning, valuation learning, stochastic fictitious play learning, experience-weighted attraction learning and delta learning with foregone payoff information in normal form games. In particular, we consider adaptive players each of whom assigns payoff assessments to his own actions, chooses the action which has the highest assessment with some perturbations and updates the assessments using observed payoffs, which may include payoffs from unchosen actions. Then, we provide conditions under which the learning process converges to a quantal response equilibrium in normal form games.

Keywords

Adaptive learning Normal form games Asynchronous stochastic approximation Quantal response equilibrium 

JEL Classification

C72 D83 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsRyutsu Keizai UniversityChibaJapan

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