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The Annals of Regional Science

, Volume 38, Issue 3, pp 499–511 | Cite as

Cournot oligopolistic competition in spatially separated markets: The Stackelberg equilibrium

  • Pablo Dorta-GonzálezEmail author
  • Dolores R. Santos-Peñate
  • Rafael Suárez-Vega
Article

Abstract.

Consider a two-stage non-cooperative Cournot game with location choice involving r firms. There are n spatially separated markets located at the vertices of a network. Each firm, first selects the location of a facility and then selects the quantities to supply to the markets in order to maximize its profit. Non-zero conjectural variation at the second stage in the model by Sarkar et al. (1997) is studied. When the demand in each market is sufficiently large, equilibrium in the quantities offered by each firm in the markets exists. Furthermore, each firm chooses to locate its facility at the vertices.

JEL classification

L13 R30 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pablo Dorta-González
    • 1
    Email author
  • Dolores R. Santos-Peñate
    • 1
  • Rafael Suárez-Vega
    • 1
  1. 1.Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos en Economía y GestiónUniversidad de Las Palmas de Gran CanariaLas Palmas de G.CSpain

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