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AI & SOCIETY

, Volume 34, Issue 4, pp 907–920 | Cite as

The problem of superintelligence: political, not technological

  • Wolfhart TotschnigEmail author
Open Forum

Abstract

The thinkers who have reflected on the problem of a coming superintelligence have generally seen the issue as a technological problem, a problem of how to control what the superintelligence will do. I argue that this approach is probably mistaken because it is based on questionable assumptions about the behavior of intelligent agents and, moreover, potentially counterproductive because it might, in the end, bring about the existential catastrophe that it is meant to prevent. I contend that the problem posed by a future superintelligence will likely be a political problem, that is, one of establishing a peaceful form of coexistence with other intelligent agents in a situation of mutual vulnerability, and not a technological problem of control.

Keywords

Superintelligence Existential risk Source of normativity 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Aïcha Liviana Messina for encouraging me to present a first draft of this paper at a conference on cosmopolitanism at the Universidad Diego Portales in December 2015, and Paula Boddington, Peter Millican, and Michael Wooldridge for inviting me to deliver a more developed draft at a workshop on the ethics of artificial intelligence at the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. I would also like to thank Karoline Feyertag, Juan Manuel Garrido, Yehida Mendoza, Simon Mussell, Juan Ormeño Karzulovic, Michał Prządka, Nicolò Sibilla, Jaan Tallinn, Szymon Toruńczyk, Johanna Totschnig, Michael Totschnig, Christoph Weiss, and the reviewers for AI & Society for their comments on subsequent versions of this paper. Lastly, I am grateful to Stefan Sorgner for giving me the opportunity to present the paper at the 9th Beyond Humanism Conference. Without their encouragement and critique, this project would not have come to fruition.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidad Diego PortalesSantiagoChile

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