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Journal of Cryptology

, Volume 32, Issue 3, pp 635–689 | Cite as

On Black-Box Complexity of Universally Composable Security in the CRS Model

  • Carmit HazayEmail author
  • Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam
Article
  • 44 Downloads

Abstract

In this work, we study the intrinsic complexity of black-box Universally Composable (UC) secure computation based on general assumptions. We present a thorough study in various corruption modelings while focusing on achieving security in the common reference string (CRS) model. Our results involve the following:
  • Static UC secure computation. Designing the first static UC oblivious transfer protocol based on public-key encryption and stand-alone semi-honest oblivious transfer. As a corollary, we obtain the first black-box constructions of UC secure computation assuming only two-round semi-honest oblivious transfer.

  • One-sided UC secure computation. Designing adaptive UC two-party computation with single corruptions assuming public-key encryption with oblivious ciphertext generation.

  • Adaptive UC secure computation. Designing adaptively secure UC commitment scheme assuming only public-key encryption with oblivious ciphertext generation. As a corollary, we obtain the first black-box constructions of adaptive UC secure computation assuming only (trapdoor) simulatable public-key encryption (as well as a variety of concrete assumptions).

    We remark that such a result was not known even under non-black-box constructions.

Keywords

UC secure computation Black-box constructions Oblivious transfer UC commitments 

Notes

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carmit Hazay
    • 1
    Email author
  • Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of EngineeringBar-Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael
  2. 2.University of RochesterRochesterUSA

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