Abstract
Leaseback decisions by firms involve the simultaneous sale of an asset and a lease agreement with the new owner. Examination of 64 leaseback decisions made by firms during 1979–1987 reveals a significant negative announcement effect. We present a theoretical framework in which all firms prefer to leaseback when there is symmetric information. When there is asymmetry of information between the manager and the market, however, firms with favorable prospects prefer to own the asset. Firms with poor prospects choose to leaseback and capture the associated depreciation tax shield through the sale. Our empirical results indicate that, besides the significant negative announcement effect, firms proposing a leaseback earn negative returns in the three months prior to the announcement. We monitor the performance of these firms for five years after the leaseback decision and compare it to five years before the announcement. There is a significant drop in operating performance as indicated by several key variables such as operating earnings before depreciation and pretax earnings. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms choose to leaseback when faced with unfavorable future prospects.
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I would like to thank S.P. Kothari, Cheng-few Lee, Scott Linn, Mike Rozeff, Ramasastry Ambarisha, and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Handa, P. An economic analysis of leasebacks. Rev Quant Finan Acc 1, 177–189 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02409671
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02409671