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The impact of imperfect monitoring on the efficiency wage hypothesis

Zusammenfassung

Es wird ein Arbeitsmarkt untersucht, in dem Arbeiter unterschiedliche Fähigkeiten aufweisen, die sie selbst, nicht aber potentielle Arbeitgeber kennen. Fähigere Arbeiter haben einen höheren Reservationslohn als weniger fähige. Wenn Unternehmer die wahren Fähigkeiten jedes einzelnen Beschäftigten auch im Laufe seiner Tätigkeit nicht feststellen können, so kann ein Gleichgewicht mit unfreiwilliger Arbeitslosigkeit existieren. Es wird gezeigt, daß bei kostspieliger und fehlerhafter Ex-post-Bewertung der Fähigkeiten die Möglichkeit unfreiwilliger Arbeitslosigkeit von der Wahl des Gleichgewichtskonzepts abhängt: Ein Nash-Gleichgewicht mit unfreiwilliger Arbeitslosigkeit existiert nicht, wohl aber ein Riley-Gleichgewicht.

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Author information

Correspondence to Gerhard Clemenz.

Additional information

This research was started and most of it completed while I was visiting the Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the University of Bonn. Financial support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank M. Hellwig for stimulating discussions as well as H. Duda, M. Nermuth, K. Podzceck, and a referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft, without, of course, implying that they bear any responsibility for the shortcomings of this paper.

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Clemenz, G. The impact of imperfect monitoring on the efficiency wage hypothesis. Empirica 13, 203–219 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00924918

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Keywords

  • Economic Growth
  • International Economic
  • Industrial Organization
  • Efficiency Wage
  • Imperfect Monitoring