Advertisement

Springer Nature is making SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 research free. View research | View latest news | Sign up for updates

Connectionism, cognitive maps and the development of objectivity

  • 59 Accesses

  • 5 Citations

Abstract

It is claimed that there are pre-objective phenomena, which cognitive science should explain by employing the notion of non-conceptual representational content. It is argued that a match between parallel distributed processing (PDP) and non-conceptual content (NCC) not only provides a means of refuting recent criticisms of PDP as a cognitive architecture; it also provides a vehicle for NCC that is required by naturalism. A connectionist cognitive mapping algorithm is used as a case study to examine the affinities between PDP and NCC.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Anderson, J. (1983).The Architecture of Cognition. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.

  2. Chalmers, D. (1990). Syntactic Transformations on Distributed Representations.Connection Science 2: 53–62.

  3. Chrisley, R. (1990). Cognitive Map Construction and Use: A Parallel Distributed Processing Approach. In Touretzky, D., Hinton, G. & Sejnowski, T. (eds.)The Proceedings of the 1990 Connectionist Models Summer School, San Mateo, CA. Morgan Kaufmann.

  4. Chrisley, R. (1991). A Hybrid Architecture for Cognitive Map Construction and Use.Artificial Intelligence & the Simulation of Behaviour: Special Issue on Hybrid Models of Cognition (78).

  5. Crane, T. (1992). The Non-Conceptual Content of Experience. In Crane, T. (ed.)The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

  6. Cussins, A. (1987). Varieties of Psychologism.Synthese 70: 123–154.

  7. Cussins, A. (1990). The Connectionist Construction of Concepts. In Boden, M. (ed.)The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, 368–440. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  8. Davies, M. (1990). Thinking Persons and Cognitive Science.AI and Society 00: 000–000.

  9. Diamond, A. (1988). Differences Between Adult and Infant Cognition: Is the Crucial Variable Presence or Absence of Language? In Weiskrantz, L. (ed.)Thought Without Language. OUP: Oxford.

  10. E. Bates & Elman, J. (1992). Connectionism and the Study of Change. Technical Report 9202, Center for Research in Language, University of California: San Diego.

  11. Elman, J. (1990). Finding Structure in Time.Cognitive Science 14: 179–212.

  12. Evans, G. (1982).The Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

  13. Fahlman, S. (1988). Faster-Learning Variations on Back-Propagation: An Empirical Study. In Touretzky, D., Hinton, G. & Sejnowski, T. (eds.)The Proceedings of the 1988 Connectionist Models Summer School, 11–20, San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann.

  14. Fodor, J. (1986). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation.Mind 94: 76–100.

  15. Fodor, J. (1987).Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

  16. Fodor, J. & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis. In Pinker, S. & Mehler, J. (eds.)Connections and Symbols. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

  17. Harris, P. (1989). Object Permanence in Infancy. In Slater, A. & Bremner, G. (eds.)Infant Development, 102–121. Lawrence Erlbaum: Hove.

  18. Haugeland, J. (1991). Representational Genera. In Ramsey, W., Stich, S. & Rumelhart, D. (eds.)Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ.

  19. Hinton, G., McClelland, J. & Rumelhart, D. (1986). Distributed Representations. InParallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, 77–109. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

  20. Hood, B. & Willatts, P. (1986). Reaching in the Dark to an Object's Remembered Position: Evidence for Object Permanence in 5-Month-Old Infants.British Journal of Developmental Psychology 4: 57–66.

  21. McDermott, D. (1981). Artificial Intelligence Meets Natural Stupidity. In Haugeland, J. (ed.)Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, 143–160. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

  22. Nagel, T. (1986).The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

  23. Peacocke, C. (1992). Scenarios, Contents and Perception. In Crane, T. (ed.)The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

  24. Plunkett, K. (1992). Connectionism and Developmental Theory.British Journal of Developmental Psychology 10: 209–254.

  25. Pollack, J. (1990). Recursive Distributed Representations.Artificial Intelligence 46: 000–000.

  26. Ramsey, W., Stich, S. & Garon, J. (1991). Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk-Psychology. In Ramsey, W., Stich, S. & Rumelhart, D. (eds.)Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ.

  27. Rosenbloom, P., Laird, J., Newell, A. & McCarl, R. (1992). A Preliminary Analysis of the SOAR Architecture as a Basis for General Intelligence. In Kirsh, D. (ed.)Foundations of Artificial Intelligence, 289–326. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

  28. Smith, B. (1992). The Owl and the Electric Encyclopedia. In Kirsh, D. (ed.)Foundations of Artificial Intelligence, 251–288. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

  29. Smolensky, P. (1987). On Variable Binding and the Representation of Symbolic Structures in Connectionist Systems. Technical Report 355-87, Department of Computer Science: University of Colorado.

  30. Smolensky, P. (1988). On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11: 1–74.

  31. Strawson, P. (1959).Individuals. Methuen, London.

  32. Touretzky, D. & Hinton, G. (1988). A Distributed Connectionist Production System.Cognitive Science 12: 423–466.

  33. van Gelder, T. (1990). Compositionality: A Connectionist Variation on a Classical Theme.Cognitive Science 14: 355–384.

  34. van Gelder, T. (1991). What is the ‘D’ in ‘PDP’? In Ramsey, W., Stich, S. & Rumelhart, D. (eds.)Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ.

  35. Woodfield, A. (1993). Do Your Concepts Develop? In Hookway, C. & Peterson, D. (eds.)The Proceedings of the 1992 Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. (In press).

Download references

Author information

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Chrisley, R.L. Connectionism, cognitive maps and the development of objectivity. Artif Intell Rev 7, 329–354 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00849059

Download citation

Key Words

  • cognitive architecture
  • cognitive map
  • concept
  • concept learning
  • connectionism
  • content
  • context-sensitivity
  • development
  • generality
  • intentionality
  • representation
  • non-conceptual content
  • parallel distributed processing
  • sub-symbolic computation
  • systematicity