, Volume 45, Issue 2–3, pp 285–297 | Cite as

The structure of Radical Probabilism

  • Brian Skyrms


Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.


Radical Probabilism Epistemological Question Dynamic Coherence Probabilist Epistemology 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Brian Skyrms
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of California, IrvineIrvineU.S.A.

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