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On the philosophical basis of essentialist theories

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Sections of earlier versions of this paper, then titled ‘Empiricism and Essentialism’, were extensively redrafted and restructured in response to comments by Tyler Burge and Gareth Evans. The paper has also benefitted from the attentions of Martin Davies, Kit Fine, Allen Hazen and Colin McGinn. I am especially grateful to Christopher Peacocke for advice and encouragement throughout.

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Forbes, G. On the philosophical basis of essentialist theories. J Philos Logic 10, 73–99 (1981).

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  • Philosophical Basis
  • Essentialist Theory