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Competition in political and economic markets

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Prepared as a response to Frey and Eichenberger's “Anomalies in Political Economy.” We thank Gordon Tullock for helpful discussions. This work was partially supported by the Taylor Experimental Laboratory at Washington University.

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Coursey, D.L., Roberts, R.D. Competition in political and economic markets. Public Choice 70, 83–88 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00239346

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Keywords

  • Public Finance
  • Economic Market