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Is there a problem about intentionality?

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This paper is partially based upon my German article (1992d), partially it develops further the considerations put forward in that article. I would like to thank Antonia Barke for translating the paper into English.

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Beckermann, A. Is there a problem about intentionality?. Erkenntnis 45, 1–23 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00226368

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