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Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism

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Van Gulick, R. Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36, 311–332 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204132

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  • Intentional Property
  • Property Epiphenomenalism