A reconstruction of Jeffrey's notion of ratifiability in terms of counterfactual beliefs
We formalize Jeffrey's (1983) notion of ratifiability and show that the resulting formal structure can be obtained more directly by means of a theory of counterfactual beliefs. One implication is that, under the appropriate formalizations, together with certain restrictions on beliefs, Bayesian decision theory and causal decision theory coincide.
KeywordsRatifiability counterfactuals correlated equilibrium
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Aumann, R. J.: 1974, ‘Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies’, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 67–96.Google Scholar
- Aumann, R. J.: 1987, ‘Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality’, Econometrica 55, 1–18.Google Scholar
- Jeffrey, R. C.: 1965, The Logic of Decision, McGraw-Hill, New York.Google Scholar
- Jeffrey, R. C.: 1983, The Logic of Decision, second edition, Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
- Lewis, D.: 1973, Counterfactuals, Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar
- Savage, L.: 1954, The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley, New York.Google Scholar
- Selten, R.: 1975, ‘Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games’, International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25–55.Google Scholar
- Stalnaker, R.: 1968, ‘A Theory of Counterfactuals’, in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar