Ethical Aspects of Male Reproductive Disorders and their Treatment

Abstract

The author provides a brief explanation of what ethics is, distinguishing between common sense ethics and critical ethics. Historically sexuality has always been strictly connected with reproduction, and this connection shedowed many issues were. Now that we are able to split sexuality from reproduction, any analysis of the various issues concerning sexual disorders has to consider that the reproductive decision (that of bringing a new offspring into the world) springs from an existential choice, even if the process may have to resort to medical assistance and involve some clinical choice as well. An adequate analysis of sexual disorders issues from the point of view of a critical ethics needs a demarcation criterion between what is medical (or clinical) and what is non-medical (existential or pertaining to ethics in general). This distinction is crucial because sexuality is a mixture of various aspects and two are of the utmost importance:

• (a) sexuality as (mere) mating for reproductive aims;

• (b) sexuality as acting for the self-realization of the person.

The so-called sexual and reproductive rights are the new cultural creation elaborated in order to promote and protect such a distinction, even if they are strongly opposed by part of common sense ethics and some religious fractions (notably the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church).

This means that we have to acknowledge that our age is one of rapid transition and that there are two opposite ethical paradigms. According to the traditional “Hippocratical paradigm” together with some religious prespectives it is morally wrong to split sexuality from reproduction, any technology in the field is to be rejected and sexual rights are nonsensical or wicked. According to the newer ethical paradigm reproductive technologies are wellcome since they can favor people’s wellbeing and self-realization. Therefore, ICSI as well as other forms of assisted reproduction are morally permitted. Moreover, since in most social systems parenthood depends on social criteria (responsability for the child, and not “genetic or blood” criteria), from the point of view of critical ethics, that donor insemination as well as surrogacy are to me permitted.

Other issues concerning sexual issues are examined such as erectile disfunctions, homosexuality, transexuality, intersexuality, sexuality of the disabled people, sexuality of the prisoners and chemical castration.

The conclusion is that from a critical ethics’ point of view the new treatments of sexual disorders that has been examined are morally valuable and supported by good reasons, even though the author is aware that they are open to questions and should be debated.