1. The meaning of “fundamental preferences”

   • S. -C. Kolm

   OriginalPaper Pages: 193 - 198

2. Reply to Kolm

   • John Broome

   Letter Pages: 199 - 201

3. Rejoinder to John Broome

   • Serge-Christophe Kolm

   ReviewPaper Pages: 203 - 204

4. Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

   • William Thomson

   OriginalPaper Pages: 205 - 223

5. Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments

   • Diego Moreno

   OriginalPaper Pages: 225 - 240

6. A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods

   • Salvador Barberà
   • Matthew Jackson

   OriginalPaper Pages: 241 - 252

7. The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences

   • Dominique Lepelley
   • Boniface Mbih

   OriginalPaper Pages: 253 - 265

8. A note on the strategic aspects of the transfer paradox

   • Milind Rao

   OriginalPaper Pages: 267 - 272

9. The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case

   • Jerry S. Kelly

   OriginalPaper Pages: 273 - 281

10. Further notes on Craven's conjecture

    • John Craven

    OriginalPaper Pages: 283 - 285

11. Book review

    • Arunava Sen

    BookReview Pages: 287 - 287