Abstract
Insanity has long been viewed as an “excuse” rather than a “justification”: Insane people are acquitted not because they did nothing wrong, but because they are considered morally blameless for their wrongful conduct. A new substantive test based on justificatory rather than exculpatory principles—a “quasisubjective justification” (QSJ) test—is compared to Finkel's “relative culpability” test, and to two “excuse” oriented tests, ALI and IDRA, across seven cases. QSJ and Finkel's test both produced significant verdict differences, whereas ALI and IDRA verdicts were not significantly different. The QSJ effect, however, was observed only in cases judged low in justification, and thus did not play a determinative role across cases; other variables, such as perceived severity of the disorder and culpability for bringing about the disorder, to which only Finkel's test was sensitive, seem to have more explanatory power.
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Finkel, N.J., Slobogin, C. Insanity, justification, and culpability toward a unifying schema. Law Hum Behav 19, 447–464 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499337
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499337