Collection
Epistemic Vices: From the Individual to the Collective
A central theme of contemporary vice epistemology concerns the individual and the collective levels of epistemic life. A main message of social epistemology is that our epistemic agency is scaffolded by social and collective structures and practices. This means we need to investigate the collective dimensions of epistemic vice. There are several points of contact. Individual epistemic vices have collective effects. Individual epistemic vices can develop in relation to collective norms and structures. Certain epistemic vices may be manifested by collectives—and so on. A main aim of this Topical Collection is to explore these and many other issues about the collective dimensions of epistemic vice. Some indicative questions explored in the Collection include: Some indicative questions include:
- Can collectives be epistemically vicious?
- Are epistemically vicious collectives substantially different from epistemically vicious individuals, and, if so, how?
- Are there any exclusively collective epistemic vices?
- How does attention to collective structures affect our thinking about the nature and significance of epistemic vices?
- How do proposals for ameliorating epistemic vices look when extended to the collective level?
- How can vice epistemology and social epistemology enrich, inform, and challenge one another?
Editors
-
Ian James Kidd
Ian teaches and researches at the Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham. His research interests include a range of topics in social, character, and applied epistemology, especially anything to do with epistemic vices and virtues and the 'non-ideal' realities of our collective epistemic life. He co-edited 'Vice Epistemology' with Heather Battaly and Quassim Cassam and co-edited 'The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice' with José Medina and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr.
