Hegel and the Foundation of Right

Sparby, Terje

doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9175-5_14

Terje Sparby²

Part of the book series: Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey ((COPH,volume 12))

Abstract

For Hegel, the ultimate foundation of right is spirit. Spirit essentially consists of self-knowledge. In Isaiah Berlin's critique of Hegel, the view that there is a true self (spirit) that can be known rationally is connected to an anti-pluralist, potentially totalitarian standpoint. Charles Taylor has argued successfully against that there is such a connection. This opens up for reading of Hegel's Philosophy of Right that both includes a fully fledged concept of spirit and is sensitive to pluralist concerns. Such a reading not only gives a better representation of the historical Hegel, but is also points to his contemporary relevance.

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Notes

1.
Hegel , G. W. F (1986) Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, vol. 7. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Hereafter references to the Suhrkamp-edition of Hegel ’s works will be given as TWA followed by volume number and page.
2.
Though some have read Hegel in this way, it is a reading that is based on a misleading translation. See Franco , Paul (1999) Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 288. In § 258Z TWA 7, 403), Hegel states: “Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, dass der Staat ist”. “Der Gang Gottes” can be translated as “the way of God in the world” (as Avineri does in Avineri , Shlomo (1972) Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 176–177) rather than as the less neutral “the march of God in the world”.
3.
Pinkard , Terry (2012) Hegel’s Naturalism. Mind, Nature, and the Final End of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 194.
4.
Ibid., p. 105.
5.
Honneth , Axel (2011) Das Recht der Freiheit. Berlin: Suhrkamp, p. 17: “Die Voraussetzung eines idealistischen Monismus, in den er [Hegel ] seinen dialektischen Begriff des Geistes verankert hat, ist für uns, die Kinder eines materialistisch augeklärten Zeitalters, nicht mehr recht vorstellbar, so daß auch für seine Idee eines objektiven, in den sozialen Instutitionen vewirklichten Geistes eine andere Grundlage gesucht werden muß.”
6.
TWA 4: 80.
7.
TWA 7: 50.
8.
TWA 7: 53.
9.
TWA 7: 54, 57.
10.
TWA 7: 54.
11.
TWA 7: 57.
12.
TWA 7: 57.
13.
TWA 7: 70–71.
14.
TWA 7: 291.
15.
TWA 7: 240–241.
16.
TWA 7: 239.
17.
TWA 7: 218.
18.
TWA 7: 233.
19.
TWA 7: 250.
20.
TWA 7: 251.
21.
TWA 7: 253.
22.
TWA 7: 261.
23.
TWA 7: 262.
24.
TWA 7: 307.
25.
TWA 7: 310, 338.
26.
TWA 7: 353.
27.
If the military class is counted, there are four. The military class, however, is not concerned with the inner life of the state.
28.
TWA 7: 360.
29.
Cf. TWA 7: 397.
30.
TWA 7: 396.
31.
TWA 7: 395.
32.
TWA 7: 451.
33.
TWA 7: 476–479.
34.
TWA 7: 499–500.
35.
TWA 7: 503.
36.
TWA 10: 35.
37.
Berlin; Isaiah (2002) “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Harding, Henry (ed.) Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 170: “By being free in this sense I mean not being interfered with by others. The wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom .”
38.
Cf. ibid., p. 169: “What is the area within which the subject – a person or a group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?”
39.
Ibid., p. 171.
40.
Ibid., p. 173.
41.
Ibid., p. 175.
42.
Ibid., p. 178.
43.
Ibid., p. 181.
44.
Ibid., p. 186.
45.
Ibid., p. 193.
46.
Ibid., p. 214.
47.
Cf. ibid., p. 72: “Das Selbstbewußtsein, das seinen Gegenstand, Inhalt und Zweck bis zu dieser Allgemeinheit reinigt und erhebt, tut dies als das im Willen sich durchsetzende Denken. Hier ist der Punkt, auf welchem es erhellt, daß der Wille nur als denkende Intelligenz wahrhafter, freier Wille ist.”
48.
Ibid., p. 193.
49.
Ibid., p. 185.
50.
Ibid., p. 193.
51.
Ibid., p. 181.
52.
Ibid., p. 213.
53.
Ibid., p. 214.
54.
Ibid., p. 216.
55.
Ibid., p. 217.
56.
Ibid., p. 175.
57.
Ibid., p. 177.
58.
Taylor , Charles (1985) “What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty,” in Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 211.
59.
Ibid., p. 212.
60.
Ibid., p. 215.
61.
Ibid., p. 216.
62.
Ibid., p. 216.
63.
Ibid., p. 220.
64.
Ibid., pp. 228–229.
65.
Berlin , Isaiah (2002) “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Harding , Henry (ed.) Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 199, n. 1 f.
66.
TWA 7: 83 f.
67.
TWA 10: 352.
68.
TWA 7: 347–352.

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Institute of Philosophy, Humbolt Universität of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Terje Sparby

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Correspondence to Terje Sparby .

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Institute for the History of Ideas, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Guttorm Fløistad

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Sparby, T. (2015). Hegel and the Foundation of Right. In: Fløistad, G. (eds) Philosophy of Justice. Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9175-5_14

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9175-5_14
Published: 20 August 2014
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-9174-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-9175-5
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