Abstract
The philosophical complex of Vedānta is well-known outside of India. All through the nineteenth century European thinkers gained their knowledge of Indian philosophy through the prism of Vedāntic conceptions until, that is, Buddhism became the main preoccupation of their research. There exists an extensive literature devoted to the exposition of Vedānta and its comparison with the principal systems of Western philosophy. According to traditional understanding, Vedānta,or more specifically Advaita Vedānta (literally: ‘non-dual conclusion of the Veda’) is a typical example and a most sophisticated version of absolute monism. Struck by the parallels between Śamkara and Hegel, some authors have summarily called Advaita a “system of objective dialectical idealism” [1]. Such a definition, given from the vantage point of European philosophy and with the help of its system-bound terminology, commits one to too much, because, to begin with, the first principle of Vedānta is not the opposition of thinking to being but their original and persistent non-distinction (hence Advaita, i.e. ‘Non-duality’, rather than ‘Monism’). An abstract analysis of definitions, however, is not a purpose in this paper. The problems and difficulties of intercultural understanding in philosophy may be merely alluded to, because the aim of the present article is not the interpretation of the principles of Vedānta.
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Notes and References
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Zilberman, D.B., Cohen, R.S. (1988). Revelation in Advaita Vedānta as an Experiment in the Semantic Destruction of Language. In: Cohen, R.S. (eds) The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 102. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1431-5_5
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