Abstract
According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a “how question” and “why question,” and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience arises from brain states. From this perspective, I discuss the different kinds of evolutionary explanations (e.g., adaptationist, exaptationist, spandrel) that can explain the origins of the qualitative aspects of various conscious states. This argument is intended to clarify which parts of Chalmers’ hard problem are amenable to scientific analysis.
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Notes
- 1.
It should be noted, however, that from the perspective of materialists, (1) begs the question on behalf of the dualist. If “mental states” simply are brain states (as in identity theory), then the question of how mental states arise from brain states is a pseudo-question for which there is no meaningful answer. Other materialists would reject Chalmers’ (and Nagel’s) methodological assumption that a satisfactory theory of consciousness must explain the phenomena of experience (or qualia). Some materialists object that this controversial assumption has not been sufficiently argued for, that it rests on a set of flimsy intuitions, or that it ultimately relies on a fallacious appeal to ignorance (Churchland 1996; Dennett 1996; cf. Chalmers 1997). Moreover, some eliminativists argue that the class of things regarded as “qualia” are too poorly defined to constitute a proper explanandum, and hence, qualia should be eliminated (rather than explained) in a theory of consciousness (Dennett 1988; Churchland 1996).
- 2.
Although I have distinguished Chalmers’ why question into a more general and specific formulation, these two questions are clearly related. In the conclusion of this chapter, I suggest that evolutionary answers to (b) will help to make progress on answering the more general question asked in (a). With respect to (a), I maintain that neural states are accompanied by qualitative experience because of evolutionary history; however, I resist drawing the stronger (adaptationist) conclusion that qualitative experience exists because it was adaptive. While the origins of the qualitative aspects of consciousness can often be explained in terms of their adaptive function (e.g., pain states or hunger states), I maintain that some conscious states are better explained by non-adaptationist explanations.
- 3.
The analysis of this chapter is intended to be neutral on metaphysical issues concerning dualism versus materialism. The main goal of the chapter is to show that there are scientific explanations available for the reductionist and materialist to address Chalmers’ why question.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to David Chalmers, Stephen Biggs, William Robinson, David Alexander, Liz Stillwaggon Swan, Curtis Metcalfe, John Koolage, Heimir Geirsson, Gordon Knight, and Murat Aydede for very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter.
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Tsou, J.Y. (2013). Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers’ Hard Problem. In: Swan, L. (eds) Origins of Mind. Biosemiotics, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5419-5_13
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