Abstract
The ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than ε to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed strategy. The smallest constant ε currently known for which there is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games is slightly below 2/3. In this paper we study this problem for symmetric bimatrix games and we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a (1/2 + δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium, for an arbitrarily small positive constant δ.
Partially supported by the Centre for Discrete Mathematics and its Applications (DIMAP) and EPSRC grant EP/D063191/1.
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Czumaj, A., Fasoulakis, M., Jurdziński, M. (2014). Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games. In: Lavi, R. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8768. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_21
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