Abstract
We consider the task of computing an approximation of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium for an n-player game in strategic form, n ≥ 3. We show that this task is complete for the complexity class FIXP a . In particular, the task is polynomial time equivalent to the task of computing an approximation of a Nash equilibrium in strategic form games with three (or more) players.
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Etessami, K., Hansen, K.A., Miltersen, P.B., Sørensen, T.B. (2014). The Complexity of Approximating a Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium of a Multi-player Game in Strategic Form. In: Lavi, R. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8768. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_20
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