Abstract
We present PRALINE, which is the first tool to compute Nash equilibria in games played over graphs. We consider concurrent games: at each step, players choose their actions independently. There can be an arbitrary number of players. The preferences of the players are given by payoff functions that map states to integers, the goal for a player is then to maximize the limit superior of her payoff; this can be seen as a generalization of Büchi objectives. PRALINE looks for pure Nash equilibria in these games. It can construct the strategies of the equilibrium and users can play against it to test the equilibrium. We give the idea behind its implementation and present examples of its practical use.
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Work supported by ERC Starting Grant inVEST (279499).
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Brenguier, R. (2013). PRALINE: A Tool for Computing Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games. In: Sharygina, N., Veith, H. (eds) Computer Aided Verification. CAV 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8044. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39799-8_63
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39799-8_63
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