Abstract
Walsh [23,22], Davies et al. [9], and Narodytska et al. [20] studied various voting systems empirically and showed that they can often be manipulated effectively, despite their manipulation problems being NP-hard. Such an experimental approach is sorely missing for NP-hard control problems, where control refers to attempts to tamper with the outcome of elections by adding/delet-ing/partitioning either voters or candidates. We experimentally tackle NP-hard control problems for Bucklin and fallback voting, which among natural voting systems with efficient winner determination are the systems currently known to display the broadest resistance to control in terms of NP-hardness [12,11]. We also investigate control resistance experimentally for plurality voting, one of the first voting systems analyzed with respect to electoral control [1,18].
Our findings indicate that NP-hard control problems can often be solved effectively in practice. Moreover, our experiments allow a more fine-grained analysis and comparison—across various control scenarios, vote distribution models, and voting systems—than merely stating NP-hardness for all these control problems.
This work was supported in part by DFG grants RO 1202/15-1 and RO 1202/12-1 (within the EUROCORES programme LogICCC of the ESF), SFF grant “Cooperative Normsetting” of HHU Düsseldorf, and a DAAD grant for a PPP project in the PROCOPE programme.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bartholdi III, J., Tovey, C., Trick, M.: How hard is it to control an election? Mathematical and Computer Modelling 16(8/9), 27–40 (1992)
Baumeister, D., Erdélyi, G., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Computational aspects of approval voting. In: Laslier, J., Sanver, R. (eds.) Handbook on Approval Voting, ch.10, pp. 199–251. Springer (2010)
Berg, S.: Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity. Public Choice 47(2), 377–387 (1985)
Brams, S., Fishburn, P.: Approval Voting. Birkhäuser (1983)
Brams, S., Sanver, R.: Voting systems that combine approval and preference. In: Brams, S., Gehrlein, W., Roberts, F. (eds.) The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn, pp. 215–237. Springer (2009)
Cheeseman, P., Kanefsky, B., Taylor, W.: Where the really hard problems are. In: Proc. IJCAI 1991, pp. 331–337. Morgan Kaufmann (1991)
Coleman, T., Teague, V.: On the complexity of manipulating elections. In: Proc. CATS 2007., vol. 65, pp. 25–33 (2007)
Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T., Lang, J.: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? Journal of the ACM 54(3), Article 14 (2007)
Davies, J., Katsirelos, G., Narodytska, N., Walsh, T.: Complexity of and algorithms for Borda manipulation. In: Proc. AAAI 2011, pp. 657–662. AAAI Press (August 2011)
Erdélyi, G., Fellows, M.: Parameterized control complexity in Bucklin voting and in fallback voting. In: Proc. COMSOC 2010, pp. 163–174. Universität Düsseldorf (2010)
Erdélyi, G., Piras, L., Rothe, J.: The complexity of voter partition in Bucklin and fallback voting: Solving three open problems. In: Proc. AAMAS 2011, pp. 837–844. IFAAMAS (2011)
Erdélyi, G., Rothe, J.: Control complexity in fallback voting. In: Proc. CATS 2010. CRPIT Series, vol. 32(8), pp. 39–48. Australian Computer Society (2010)
Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L.: Using complexity to protect elections. Commun. ACM 53(11), 74–82 (2010)
Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: A richer understanding of the complexity of election systems. In: Ravi, S., Shukla, S. (eds.) Fundamental Problems in Computing: Essays in Honor of Professor Daniel J., ch.14, pp. 375–406. Springer (2009)
Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: The shield that never was: Societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control. Information and Computation 209(2), 89–107 (2011)
Faliszewski, P., Procaccia, A.: AI’s war on manipulation: Are we winning? AI Magazine 31(4), 53–64 (2010)
Gent, I., Walsh, T.: Phase transitions from real computational problems. In: Proc. ISAI 1995, pp. 356–364 (1995)
Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative. Artificial Intelligence 171(5-6), 255–285 (2007)
Hoag, C., Hallett, G.: Proportional Representation. Macmillan (1926)
Narodytska, N., Walsh, T., Xia, L.: Manipulation of Nanson’s and Baldwin’s rules. In: Proc. AAAI 2011, pp. 713–718. AAAI Press (August 2011)
Rothe, J., Schend, L.: Typical-case challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: A survey. In: Website Proceedings of the Special Session on Computational Social Choice at the 12th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (2012)
Walsh, T.: Where are the really hard manipulation problems? The phase transition in manipulating the veto rule. In: Proc. IJCAI 2009, pp. 324–329. IJCAI (2009)
Walsh, T.: An empirical study of the manipulability of single transferable voting. In: Proc. ECAI 2010, pp. 257–262. IOS Press (2010)
Zuckerman, M., Procaccia, A., Rosenschein, J.: Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem. Artificial Intelligence 173(2), 392–412 (2009)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Rothe, J., Schend, L. (2012). Control Complexity in Bucklin, Fallback, and Plurality Voting: An Experimental Approach. In: Klasing, R. (eds) Experimental Algorithms. SEA 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7276. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30850-5_31
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30850-5_31
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30849-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30850-5
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)