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Criminal Responsibility, Free Will, and Neuroscience

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Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will

Part of the book series: Understanding Complex Systems ((UCS))

Summary

This chapter identifies retributive and consequentialist purposes of the criminal law, and it outlines arguments that retribution should be abandoned, in cluding arguments, based on philosophy and neuroscience, that free will and re sponsibility are illusions. The author suggests that there are good reasons to retain retribution, and identifies ways in which this might be supported, including com patibilist and libertarian views of free will. The author gives reasons for preferring libertarian views, and concludes by considering the role that neuroscience may be expected to play in the future development of the law.

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hodgson, D. (2009). Criminal Responsibility, Free Will, and Neuroscience. In: Murphy, N., Ellis, G.F.R., O’Connor, T. (eds) Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Understanding Complex Systems. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03205-9_14

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