Abstract
While transparency in financial markets should enhance liquidity, its exploitation by unethical and parasitic traders discourages others from fully embracing disclosure of their own information. Traders exploit both the private information in upstairs markets used to trade large orders outside traditional exchanges and the public information present in exchanges’ quoted limit order books. Using homomorphic cryptographic protocols, market designers can create “partially transparent” markets in which every matched trade is provably correct and only beneficial information is revealed. In a cryptographic securities exchange, market operators can hide information to prevent its exploitation, and still prove facts about the hidden information such as bid/ask spread or market depth.
The original version of this chapter was revised: The copyright line was incorrect. This has been corrected. The Erratum to this chapter is available at DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_37
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Thorpe, C., Parkes, D.C. (2007). Cryptographic Securities Exchanges. In: Dietrich, S., Dhamija, R. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4886. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_16
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