Position Auctions with Externalities
- Patrick HummelAffiliated withGoogle Inc.
- , R. Preston McAfeeAffiliated withMicrosoft Corp.
This paper presents models for predicted click-through rates in position auctions that take into account the externalities ads shown in other positions may impose on the probability that an ad in a particular position receives a click. We present a general axiomatic methodology for how click probabilities are affected by the qualities of the ads in the other positions, and illustrate that using these axioms will increase revenue as long as higher quality ads tend to be ranked ahead of lower quality ads. We also present appropriate algorithms for selecting the optimal allocation of ads when predicted click-through rates are governed by a natural special case of this axiomatic model of externalities.
- Position Auctions with Externalities
- Book Title
- Web and Internet Economics
- Book Subtitle
- 10th International Conference, WINE 2014, Beijing, China, December 14-17, 2014. Proceedings
- pp 417-422
- Print ISBN
- Online ISBN
- Series Title
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Series Volume
- Series ISSN
- Springer International Publishing
- Copyright Holder
- Springer International Publishing Switzerland
- Additional Links
- Industry Sectors
- eBook Packages
- Editor Affiliations
- 15. Microsoft Research
- 16. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
- 17. Deptartment of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University
- Author Affiliations
- 18. Google Inc., USA
- 19. Microsoft Corp., USA
To view the rest of this content please follow the download PDF link above.