Disasters and Conflict Zones Around the World: The Roles and Relationships of the Military and Nongovernmental Organizations

In 2007, Dr. Wilson deployed to Afghanistan as the physician for a 600-soldier Airborne Infantry Battalion on a combat/counterinsurgency mission. During that 15-month deployment, he worked hand-in-hand and shoulder-to-shoulder with varying success with assorted NGOs, IGOs, local physicians, Afghan Ministry of Health officials, allied military forces, and the colocated Provincial Reconstruction Team. His dual duties as the unit surgeon caring for trauma and routine medical aliments of coalition military units and his job assisting in the building of the Afghan health care system as part of the counterinsurgency fight placed him at the crossroads of military and NGO interaction.

This chapter offers Dr. Wilson’s perspective on the current issues facing NGO–military interaction and his recommendations for continued improvement.

This chapter offers Dr. Wilson’s perspective on the current issues facing NGO–military interaction and his recommendations for continued improvement.

The co-location of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and military forces in areas requiring humanitarian aid, disaster assistance, or reconstruction has become a reality of the twenty-first century. During the 1990s, numerous complex emergencies, disasters, and military conflicts brought armed forces and NGOs into close proximity, increasing the frequency of interaction as they pursued their missions (Burkle 1999). Although both groups often shared the goals of effecting positive change and building capacity in response to crisis, their backgrounds, motivations, and perspectives differed radically. They tended to misunderstand each other’s goals and methods. As a result, friction arose that hindered both of them in their work (Weiss 1997).

Appendices

Appendix 1: Information and Links to Civil–Military Coordination and Interaction

• 1. Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs (COE-DMHA)

• (a) Web site: http://www.coe-dmha.org/

• (b) Mission: The Center’s mission is to promote effective civil–military management in international humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and peacekeeping through education, training, research, and information programs.

• 2. Center of Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CD-HAM)

• (a) Web site: http://www.usuhs.mil/mem/cdham.html

• (b) Mission: The Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine is a ­university-based venture whose mission is to advance the understanding and delivery of disaster medical care and humanitarian assistance worldwide. The uniquely positioned academic center is actively developing relationships between governmental agencies, nongovernmental agencies, and private volunteer organizations as a means of improving relief efforts.

• 3. The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Chapter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response

• (a) Web site: http://www.sphereproject.org

• (b) Mission: The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. Sphere is based on two core beliefs: first, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and second, that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a right to assistance. Sphere includes three things: a handbook, a broad process of collaboration, and an expression of commitment to quality and accountability. The project has developed several tools, the key one being the handbook.

• 4. InterAction

  • (a) Web site: http://www.interaction.org

  • (b) Mission: InterAction is the largest coalition of US-based international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people.

• 5. IASC reference paper on civil–military relationship in complex emergencies, June 2004 (http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc)

• 6. Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross & Red Crescent movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (http://www.ifrc.org)

• 7. Sphere Humanitarian Charter (http://www.sphere.org)

• 8. International Humanitarian Law (http://www.icrc.org)

• 9. International Human Rights Law (http://www.ohchr.org)

• 10. Secretary General’s bulletin on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (http://www.un.org)

• 11. Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (http://www.hapinternational.org)

• 12. JPO documentation and reports (http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coordination/NGO)

• 13. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: (http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/guidelines)

• 14. ReliefWeb (http://www.reliefweb.int)

• 15. United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/)

Appendix 2: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

Core Principles on the Responsibility to Protect Report (2001)

Right Intention

• “The primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering.” para 4.33

• Right intention is better assured with collective or multilateral operations, “clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.” synopsis p. xii

Last Resort

• “Every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis [must be] explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.” synopsis p. xii

• “The responsibility to react…can only be justified when the responsibility to prevent has been fully discharged.” para 4.37

Proportional Means

• “The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question.” para 4.39

• All rules of humanitarian law must be strictly observed.

Reasonable Prospects

• “There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.” synopsis p. xii

Right Authority

• “There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes.” synopsis p. xii

• “The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out.” synopsis p. xii

Appendix 3: Military Operations Other than War

Selected Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) missions that relate to Complex Emergencies and NGO Interaction from Army Field Manual 100-7 ( 1995 )

1.1 Security Assistance

The Army conducts security assistance operations to provide military articles, training, and defense-related services authorized by statute law. Security assistance is a key element of US foreign policy, with Department of State as the lead agent supported by the Department of Defense. These operations are strictly controlled by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which deals with international military education and training (IMET), or the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which deals with foreign military sales. The US Government provides security assistance on a credit or cash basis to the host nation. Senior army commanders must be careful not to commit the US Government to providing any assistance that could be construed as security assistance without following the statutory requirements.

1.2 Nation Assistance

Nation assistance programs promote stability and orderly progress, thus contributing to the prevention of conflict. If internal conflict has begun, the goal of nation assistance is to aid in removing its root causes. Nation assistance becomes a primary means of bringing the conflict to a successful resolution according to the internal defense and development strategy. Nation assistance consists of general missions such as assisting with development-related infrastructure projects, training health care workers, and improving the professionalism of national military forces. Nation assistance missions can generate useful good will toward the USA and assist friendly governments.

1.3 Noncombatant Evacuation

Noncombatant Evacuations (NEOs) are normally conducted to evacuate US civilian noncombatants and nonessential US military personnel from locations in a foreign (host) nation to a safe haven, preferably the USA. An NEO is normally conducted to evacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger from a hostile environment or natural disaster. NEOs may also include the selective evacuation of citizens of the host nation and third-country nationals. NEOs involve swift, temporary occupancy of an objective, perhaps using temporarily disabling technologies to minimize casualties and end with planned withdrawals. They may include the use of force. Under ideal circumstances, little or no opposition to the operation exists. Still, commanders must anticipate and plan for possible hostilities. If military forces are employed in an NEO, they usually comprise units from more than one service. Evacuation operations differ from other military operations, since direction of the operation may remain with the American ambassador at the time of the evacuation. Further, the order to evacuate is a diplomatic – rather than a military – decision, with extensive ramifications. FM 90-29 provides details on NEO operations.

1.4 Peacekeeping

Military peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The single, most important requirement of a peacekeeping operation is consent to the operation by all the parties to the dispute. Such consent represents an explicit agreement, permitting the introduction of a neutral third party. The USA may participate in peacekeeping operations under the sponsorship of the UN or other International Organization, such as the Organization of American States, or in cooperation with other countries. The UN has been the most frequent sponsor of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situations that require the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. Based on the peacekeeping mandate and the stationing agreement, follow-on command directives and rules of engagement (ROE) are established.

1.5 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are unique peacetime operations because they could be conducted within the continental United States (CONUS). Recent examples in the USA have included assistance rendered in the northwest states to contain forest fires and relief operations following Hurricanes Hugo in 1989 and Andrew in 1992. These operations fall within the category of support to domestic civil authorities. Examples of in-theater operations include famine relief efforts in Somalia and hurricane relief operations in Hawaii following Hurricane Iniki. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations provide emergency relief to victims of natural or man-made disasters. These operations may include refugee assistance, food preparation and distribution programs, medical treatment and care, damage assessment and control, forensic identification, maintenance of law and order, reestablishment of communications networks, and sanitation/water facilities. ARFOR is committed to these operations when localities become overwhelmed by the extent of the situation and can no longer provide basic human needs and protection. The ability to respond on short notice with a wide array of capabilities is a unique attribute of the Army. The length of commitment is normally limited to the time that communities and other government and private agencies can handle continued operations by themselves. When properly executed, military participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations has long-term positive effects. Overseas, such participation demonstrates good will and engenders mutual respect. At home, it provides soldiers the opportunity to demonstrate their skills while helping their fellow citizens.

Appendix 4: Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1995)

1.1 Principle Commitments

• 1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.

• 2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed, or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.

• 3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.

• 4. We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.

• 5. We shall respect culture and custom.

• 6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.

• 7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.

• 8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.

• 9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.

• 10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.

Code of Conduct was sponsored by: Caritas Inter­nationalis, Catholic Relief Services, The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, The World Council of Churches, The International Committee of the Red Cross, Members of the Steering Committee for Humani­tarian Response.

Full expansive version can be found at the Web site of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/code.asp.

Appendix 5: Excerpts of “The Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and NonGovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments Developed by InterAction” (2007b)

1.1 Recommended Guidelines

• A. For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines should be observed consistent with military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements:

• 1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any military clothing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appropriate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment in appropriate situations.

• 2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites should be by prior arrangement.

• 3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites.

• 4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of meeting with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military installations for information exchanges.

• 5. U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as “force multipliers” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fashion that could compromise their independence and their goal to be perceived by the population as independent.

• 6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid interfering with NGHO relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.

• 7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect the desire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the ­military, in which case such cooperation will be carried out with due regard to avoiding compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO representatives, or public perceptions of their independence.

• B. For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be observed:

• 1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style clothing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO personnel from wearing protective gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items.

• 2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be limited to liaison personnel to the extent practical.

• 3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facilities inhabited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel.

• 4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.

• 5. NGHO personnel’s visits to military facilities/sites should be by prior arrangement.

• 6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sections that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at military bases and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature that might compromise their independence.

• 7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military protection for convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision of such military support to NGHOs rests solely within the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Support generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with applicable U.S. law.

• C. Recommendations on forms of coordination, to the extent feasible, that will minimize the risk of confusion between military and NGHO roles in hostile or potentially hostile environments, subject to military force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements are:

• 1. NGHO liaison officer participation in unclassified security briefings conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces.

• 2. Unclassified information sharing with the NGHO liaison officer on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and unexploded ordnance, humanitarian activities, and population movements, insofar as such unclassified information sharing is for the purpose of facilitating humanitarian operations and the security of staff and local personnel engaged in these operations.

• 3. Liaison arrangements with military commands prior to and during military operations to deconflict military and relief activities, including for the purpose of protection of humanitarian installations and personnel and to inform military personnel of humanitarian relief objectives, modalities of operation, and the extent of prospective or ongoing civilian humanitarian relief efforts.

• 4. Military provision of assistance to NGHOs for humanitarian relief activities in extremis when civilian providers are unavailable or unable to do so. Such assistance will not be provided if it interferes with higher priority military activities.

1.2 Recommended Processes

• A. Procedures for NGHO/military dialogue during contingency planning for DOD relief operations in a hostile or potentially hostile environment:

• 1. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command for discussions with the contingency planners responsible for designing relief operations.

• 2. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small number of liaison officers to the relevant combatant command (e.g., one liaison was stationed at U.S. CENTCOM for 6 of the first 2 months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was in Kuwait City before U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003).

• 3. The relevant military planners, including but not limited to the Civil Affairs representatives of the relevant commander, meet with humanitarian relief NGHO liaison officers at a mutually agreed location.

• B. Procedures for NGHOs and the military to access assessments of humanitarian needs. U.S. military and NGHO representatives should explore the following:

• 1. Access to NGHO and military assessments directly from a DOD or other U.S. Government Web site.

• 2. Access to NGHO and military assessments through an NGO serving in a coordination role and identifying a common Web site.

• 3. Access to NGHO and military assessments through a U.S. Government or United Nations (UN) Web site.

• C. Procedures for NGHO liaison relationships with combatant commands that are engaged in planning for military operations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (NGHO liaison personnel are provided by the NGHO community):

• 1. The NGHO liaison officer should not be physically located within the military headquarters, but if feasible should be close to it in order to allow for daily contact.

• 2. The NGHO liaison officer should have appropriate access to senior-level officers within the combatant commands and be permitted to meet with them as necessary and feasible.

• 3. There should be a two-way information flow. The NGHO liaison officer should provide details on NGHO capabilities, infrastructure if any, plans, concerns, etc. The military should provide appropriate details regarding minefields, unexploded ordnance, other hazards to NGHOs, access to medical facilities, evacuation plans, etc.

• 4. The NGHO liaison officer should have the opportunity to brief military commanders on NGHO objectives, the Code of Conduct of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged in Disaster Relief, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines, country-specific guidelines based on the IASC Guidelines, and, if desired, The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. U.S. Armed Forces personnel should have the opportunity to brief NGHOs, to the extent appropriate, on U.S. Government and coalition goals and policies, monitoring principles, applicable laws and rules of engagement, etc.

• 5. The NGHO liaison officer could continue as a liaison at higher headquarters even after a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or similar mechanism is established in-country. Once this occurs, liaison officers of individual NGHOs could begin coordination in-country through the CMOC for civil–military liaison.

• D. Possible organizations that could serve as a bridge between NGHOs and U.S. Armed Forces in the field, e.g., U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Military Affairs, State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator:

• 1. If the U.S. Agency for International Development or the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they should be prepared to work with the broader NGHO community in addition to U.S. Government implementing partners.

• 2. The UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator or his/her representative could be a strong candidate to serve as liaison because he/she normally would be responsible for working with all NGHOs and maintaining contact with the host government or a successor regime.

Appendix 6: Guidelines for InterAction Staff Relations with Military Forces Engaged in, or Training for, Peacekeeping and Disaster Response (2007a)

• I. Affirmation of HPPT relations with the military

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Committee (HPPC) members affirm that there should be relations between the Humanitarian Policy and Practice Team (HPPT) and the military forces identified below and that such relations should be guided by this document.

• II. Military forces covered

Military forces covered by these guidelines include those of the USA, of NATO and Partnership Countries, and of states being trained by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Affairs to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. In addition, the guidelines apply to contacts with those US civil and military authorities responsible for training African military contingents for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions within the context of the African Crisis Response Initiative.

• III. Objectives of relations

• 1. To improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response while preserving NGO independence.

• 2. To persuade governments to accept NGO views on what constitutes appropriate use of military assets in disaster response.

• 3. To influence government and military policy and doctrine and to educate the military rank and file on what use of military assets is appropriate and effective in humanitarian crises.

• 4. To inform the military as to:

• (a) The primary role and capabilities of NGOs and international organizations in humanitarian response.

• (b) The principles governing the behavior of NGOs engaged in disaster response, including their independence from the military and their needs-based and impartial approach to assisting all affected populations.

• (c) The forms of assistance the military may appropriately be asked by the humanitarian community to provide to NGOs and the populations they serve in an emergency.

• IV. Scope of relations

The means to achieving the above objectives are mutual education and advocacy. While this document does not attempt to script HPPC member involvement in these processes, HPPC members representing the InterAction community should emphasize the precepts of the IFRC/NGO Code of Conduct.

• V. Specific activities

Mutual education and advocacy initiatives in which InterAction staff and HPPC members representing InterAction may engage will include the following:

• 1. Presentations and dialogue at military schools and conferences, which advance the objectives defined above

• 2. Role-playing NGOs in military exercises and simulations of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions

• 3. Participation in the planning for these exercises and simulations as required to see that the activities scripted for NGOs are appropriate

• 4. Review for appropriate content of military guidelines addressing the relations between military forces and NGOs during peacekeeping and humanitarian missions

• 5. Predeployment consultations with military forces about to engage in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions