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On the Key Schedule Strength of PRESENT

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Book cover Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security (DPM 2011, SETOP 2011)

Abstract

We present here the results of a playful research on how to measure the strength of a key schedule algorithm, with applications to PRESENT, including its two variants with 80 and 128 bit keys. We do not claim to have discovered any devastating weakness, but believe that some of the results presented, albeit controversial, could be of interest for other researchers investigating this cipher, notably for those working in impossible differentials and related key or slide attacks. Furthermore, in the case of PRESENT, key schedule features shown here may be exploited to attack some of the PRESENT-based hash functions. We carried out a probabilistic metaheuristic search for semi-equivalent keys, annihilators and entropy minima, and proposed a simple way of combining these results into a single value with a straightforward mathematical expression that could help in abstracting resistance to the set of presented analysis. Surprisingly, PRESENT− 128 seems weaker than PRESENT− 80 in the light of this new measure.

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Hernandez-Castro, J.C., Peris-Lopez, P., Aumasson, JP. (2012). On the Key Schedule Strength of PRESENT. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Navarro-Arribas, G., Cuppens-Boulahia, N., de Capitani di Vimercati, S. (eds) Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security. DPM SETOP 2011 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7122. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28879-1_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28879-1_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-28878-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-28879-1

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