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A Signature Scheme with Efficient Protocols

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Book cover Security in Communication Networks (SCN 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2576))

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Abstract

Digital signature schemes are a fundamental cryptographic primitive, of use both in its own right, and as a building block in cryptographic protocol design. In this paper, we propose a practical and provably secure signature scheme and show protocols (1) for issuing a signature on a committed value (so the signer has no information about the signed value), and (2) for proving knowledge of a signature on a committed value. This signature scheme and corresponding protocols are a building block for the design of anonymity-enhancing cryptographic systems, such as electronic cash, group signatures, and anonymous credential systems. The security of our signature scheme and protocols relies on the Strong RSA assumption. These results are a generalization of the anonymous credential system of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM Research Zurich Research Laboratory, CH-8803, Rüschlikon, Germany

    Jan Camenisch

  2. Computer Science Department, Brown University Providence, 02912, RI, USA

    Anna Lysyanskaya

Authors
  1. Jan Camenisch
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  2. Anna Lysyanskaya
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Università di Salerno, Via S. Allende, 84081, Baronissi (SA), Italy

    Stelvio Cimato  & Giuseppe Persiano  & 

  2. Dept. of Computer Engineering and Informatics, Computer Technology Institute and University of Patras, 26500, Rio, Greece

    Clemente Galdi

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A. (2003). A Signature Scheme with Efficient Protocols. In: Cimato, S., Persiano, G., Galdi, C. (eds) Security in Communication Networks. SCN 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2576. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36413-7_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36413-7_20

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00420-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36413-9

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