Date: 08 Jan 2008
The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
This paper presents a theoretical framework and some empirical results showing that the level of foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries, as does the recipient country’s level of education. Due account is taken of endogeneity problems in producing these results. They suggest that Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid with a special emphasis on supporting education.
Abadie, A. (2006). Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism. American Economic Review (AEA Papers & Proceedings), 96(2), 50–56.
Adam, C. S., & O’Connell, S. (1999). Aid, taxation and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economics and Politics, 11(3), 225–253. CrossRef
Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 33–63. CrossRef
Azam, J.-P. (2005). Suicide-bombing as inter-generational investment. Public Choice, 122(1–2), 177–198. CrossRef
Azam, J.-P., & Delacroix, A. (2006). Aid and the delegated fight against terrorism. Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 330–344. CrossRef
Azam, J.-P., & Laffont, J.-J. (2003). Contracting for aid. Journal of Development Economics, 70(1), 25–58. CrossRef
Azam, J.-P., & Saadi-Sedik, T. (2004). Aid v. sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds. Defense and Peace Economics, 15(4), 343–364. CrossRef
Basouchoudhary, A., & Shughart, W. F. (2007). On ethnic conflict and the origins of terrorism. Unpublished, University: University of Mississippi.
Berman, E., & Laitin, D. D. (2005). Hard targets: theory and evidence on suicide attacks. NBER WP 11740.
Berthélemy, J.-C. (2006). Bilateral donor’s interest vs. recipients’ development motives in aid allocation: do all donors behave the same? Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 179–194. CrossRef
Berthélemy, J.-C., & Tichit, A. (2004). Bilateral donors’ aid decisions—a three-dimensional panel analysis. International Review of Economics and Finance, 13, 253–274. CrossRef
Blomberg, S. B., Hess, G. D., & Weerapan, A. (2004). Economic conditions and terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), 463–478. CrossRef
Bloom, M. (2005). Dying to kill. The allure of suicide terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Blundell, R., & Powell, J. L. (2003). Endogeneity in nonparametric and semiparametric regression models. In M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, & S. J. Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in economics and econometrics: theory and applications (Vol. II, pp. 312–357). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, E. (2005). The quality of terror. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 515–530. CrossRef
Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, policies, and growth. American Economic Review, 90, 847–868. CrossRef
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (1986). Econometric models based on count data: comparisons and applications of some estimators tests. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 1(1), 29–53. CrossRef
Chauvet, L. (2002). Socio-political instability and the allocation of international aid by donors. European Journal of Political Economy, 19, 33–59. CrossRef
Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion. Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crain, N. V., & Crain, M. M. (2006). Terrorized economies. Public Choice, 128, 317–349. CrossRef
Davidson, R., & MacKinnon, J. G. (1982). Some non-nested hypothesis tests and the relations among them. Review of Economic Studies, 49, 551–565. CrossRef
Drakos, K., & Gofas, A. (2006). In search of the average transnational terrorist attack venue. Defense and Peace Economics, 17(2), 73–93. CrossRef
Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden. Why the west’s effort to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good. New York: Penguin.
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2006). The political economy of terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferrero, M. (2006). Martyrdom contracts. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(6), 855–877. CrossRef
Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2006a). How do political changes influence us bilateral aid allocation? Evidence from panel data. Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 210–223. CrossRef
Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2006b). World bank independence: a model and statistical analysis of U.S. influence. Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 224–240. CrossRef
Frey, B. S. (2004). Dealing with terrorism: stick or carrot? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Frey, B. S., Luechinger, S., & Stutzer, A. (2007). Calculating tragedy: assessing the cost of terrorism. Journal of Economic Surveys, 21(1), 1–24. CrossRef
Hassan, N. (2001). An arsenal of believers. The New Yorker, November 19.
Krueger, A. B. (2003). Poverty doesn’t create terrorism. New York Times, May 29.
Krueger, A. B., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Kto kogo? A cross-country study of the origins and targets of terrorism. Unpublished, Princeton University.
Krueger, A. B., & Maleckova, J. (2003). Education, poverty and terrorism: is there a causal connection? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 119–144. CrossRef
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P., Justesen, M. K., & Klemmensen, R. (2006). The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism. Public Choice, 128, 289–315. CrossRef
Li, Q. (2005). Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(2), 278–297. CrossRef
McCullagh, P., & Nelder, J. A. (1989). Generalized linear models. London: Chapman and Hall.
Paz, R. (2000). Higher education and the development of Palestinian Islamic groups. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 4, 81–94.
Reuter, C. (2004). My life is a weapon. A modern history of suicide bombing. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Siqueira, K., & Sandler, T. (2006). Terrorists versus the government: strategic interaction, support, and sponsorship. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(6), 878–898. CrossRef
Stern, J. (2003). Terror in the name of god. Why religious militants kill. New York: HarperCollins.
Svensson, J. (1999). Aid, growth and democracy. Economics and Politics, 11(3), 275–297. CrossRef
Svensson, J. (2000). When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality. Journal of Development Economics, 61(1), 61–84. CrossRef
Svensson, J. (2003). Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it? Journal of Development Economics, 70(2), 381–402. CrossRef
Testas, A. (2004). Determinants of terrorism in the Muslim world: an empirical cross-sectional analysis. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(2), 253–273. CrossRef
Wintrobe, R. (2006). Extremism, suicide terror, and authoritarianism. Public Choice, 128, 168–195. CrossRef
World Bank (1998). Assessing aid: what works, what doesn’t, and why. A World Bank Policy Research Report, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror
Volume 135, Issue 3-4 , pp 375-397
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer US
- Additional Links
- Foreign aid
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Toulouse School of Economics (ARQADE & IDEI) and Institut Universitaire de France, University of Toulouse 1, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000, Toulouse, France
- 2. Toulouse School of Economics (ARQADE), University of Toulouse 1, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000, Toulouse, France