Experimental Economics

, Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 476–499

Scheduling with package auctions

  • Kan Takeuchi
  • John C. Lin
  • Yan Chen
  • Thomas A. Finholt
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-010-9252-6

Cite this article as:
Takeuchi, K., Lin, J.C., Chen, Y. et al. Exp Econ (2010) 13: 476. doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9252-6

Abstract

In scientific collaborations, technologies have broadened access to scarce scientific and engineering resources. While broader access is often applauded, little attention has been focused on the problem of efficient and equitable resource allocation. This paper presents laboratory experiments designed to compare different allocation mechanisms for access to joint research facilities. Specifically, we study the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, a simultaneous ascending auction (the Resource Allocation Design, RAD), and a mechanism based on submitted rankings (Knapsack). Experimental results show that RAD and VCG are both more efficient than Knapsack, while Knapsack achieves a more equal distribution of resources than RAD or VCG. The findings highlight the need for systematic exploration of allocation mechanisms within collaboratories.

Keywords

Package auctions Scheduling Experiments 

JEL Classification

C92 D82 

Supplementary material

10683_2010_9252_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (303 kb)
(PDF 303KB)

Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kan Takeuchi
    • 1
  • John C. Lin
    • 2
  • Yan Chen
    • 2
  • Thomas A. Finholt
    • 2
  1. 1.Graduate School of EconomicsHitotsubashi UniversityTokyoJapan
  2. 2.School of InformationUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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