Abstract
Educational neutrality states that decisions about school curricula and instruction should be made independently of particular comprehensive doctrines. Many political philosophers of education reject this view in favor of some non-neutral alternative. Contrary to what one might expect, some prominent liberal neutralists have also rejected this view in parts of their work. This paper has two purposes. The first part of the paper concerns the relationship between liberal neutrality and educational neutrality. I examine arguments by Rawls and Nagel and argue that some of the same arguments they use to justify liberal neutrality also justify educational neutrality; thus, if we accept these arguments for liberal neutrality, we should also accept educational neutrality. The second part of the paper defends educational neutrality against objections that it is impossible and objections that it is undesirable.
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Notes
I shall consider different uses of “neutrality” later in the paper. I follow Rawls (1993) in his understanding of a comprehensive doctrine as one that “includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole” (13). According to this understanding, Roman Catholicism, for instance, would count as a comprehensive doctrine. One might also include particular philosophical views about wellbeing, such as ethical hedonism, as comprehensive doctrines on this definition. One important restriction is that comprehensive doctrines be “reasonable.” See Rawls (1993, 58–66) for discussion of this requirement. When I discuss comprehensive doctrines herein, I shall assume they are reasonable ones.
I am here concerned with educational institutions and the decisions made about them. Thus the focus of this paper is on neutrality as it applies to schools (broadly considered) and not on issues surrounding the cognitive processes by which people learn. I am thus using “education” in a narrower sense than it is sometimes used. The issue about schooling is a substantial one, however, and is worth a separate treatment from other broader educational issues.
This is one of the main thrusts of the “great sphere” conception of education advocated by Ackerman (1980, 159).
Reich (2002) makes this argument. I return to it in section 2.
By “educational institutions” Rawls might mean private schools, not public ones. If that is the case, then Rawls’s position may be that neutrality constraints should apply to public schools but not to private ones. I have found no other passages in his work that decisively favor this interpretation, however.
Scanlon (2003) gives an example of resolving a conflict about where to place an interstate highway as an issue that could be decided using non-neutral reasons. He claims that considerations about the intrinsic value of “unspoiled wilderness” could provide reasons for placing the highway in a particular location (163). Thus, at this level of state action, reasons internal to particular comprehensive doctrines could, he claims, legitimately provide the state with particular reasons for action.
This point will hold however one conceives of educational institutions: whether as state-run schools, as private schools funded by vouchers, or even, I would claim, as state-monitored home schools. This point about home schools receives some support from Clayton (2006). Clayton uses a similar parallel argument about the features of the political domain that I do for educational institutions to argue that parental conduct should be subject to neutrality constraints. See Clayton (2006, 93–102).
I shall consider the argument that coercion against children need not require neutral justification shortly.
See the National Conference of State Legislature’s website for current data on compulsory attendance laws: http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=12895. Certain states allow for exemptions from compulsory attendance for various reasons.
Barry (2001, 210) argues that paternalistic reasons justify providing children with a perfectionist education (he terms it “education for living”).
Brighouse (1998, 737–738) argues that neutrality constraints should not apply to policies aimed at children for this reason.
I shall consider the issue about autonomy-promoting education and its neutrality in the second part of the paper.
See Friedman (2002, 85–107) for an articulation and defense of this view.
Rawls (1993, 199) favors this aim, although he seems to conceive of it as a fairly minimal requirement.
Gutmann (1999, 64–70) presses the point about democratic citizenship as a reason not to accept a Friedman-style voucher system, although she views her own account as non-neutral.
There is also some question about whether these libertarian positions should count as liberal neutralist ones. They might instead be interpreted as liberal positions based on a commitment to a particular conception of liberty, not neutrality. For arguments that libertarian views should not even count as liberal ones, see Freeman (2002).
Similar arguments could be used to justify an “opt-out” option that allows parents to withdraw their children from state-run schools and place them in state-regulated (but not state-run) private schools.
Peter de Marneffe (2002) provides other examples of school policies that could be given neutral justification as part of a general defense of educational neutrality. He gives, for instance, an interesting argument that non-denominational school prayer could be given a neutral justification (2002, 226–227). I believe the points I make herein about neutrality of justification and education concur with his account. He further argues that the main issue for liberals and education concerns respecting rights rather than neutrality.
Mathematics education might seem too easy of a curricular example because it does not concern issues that are likely to divide citizens who hold opposing comprehensive doctrines. I consider the more controversial case of humanities education later in this section.
Arneson (2003, 210) also argues that educational neutrality is possible if it is understood along the lines of neutrality of justification. He does, however, reject liberal neutrality and, it appears, educational neutrality, as undesirable.
Rawls (1993, 135) casts doubt on autonomy as a justification for (at least some) government policy when he argues that liberalism should not be based on a comprehensive doctrine like the one advocated by Raz (1986). The classic case of a group who rejects autonomy as a value is the Old Order Amish. The clash with autonomy is made clear in the court case Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In this case, Amish parents wanted to withdraw their children from public school after eighth grade, in part to keep them from acquiring the skills needed for autonomy.
Another possibility is that neutralists should argue against humanities education. I am not aware of any neutralists who support this type of position, however. I also agree with Kraut that making all secondary education purely vocational would be undesirable.
Barry (2001, 222) raises a somewhat similar concern about instrumental justifications of the humanities being strained. His criticisms are directed at democratic educational justifications of the humanities.
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Acknowledgment
I would like to thank Harry Brighouse, Dan Hausman, Julius Sensat, Rod Stewart, and Brynn Welch for comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
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Waldren, M.S. Why Liberal Neutralists Should Accept Educational Neutrality. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 16, 71–83 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9329-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9329-0