Introduction

Over the past several years, evidence has been presented that the LNT risk assessment model for chemical- and radiation-induced cancer was based on a deliberate series of ideological deceptions by key leaders of the radiation genetics community, most notably Hermann J. Muller and Curt Stern. Much of the documentation of these actions is found in their own words, in preserved correspondence (Calabrese 2011a, b, 2012, 2013, 2014). The deceptions of Muller and Stern also extended to the US NAS BEAR I Committee where the Genetics Panel uncritically accepted the manipulated articles of Stern (Spencer and Stern 1948; Uphoff and Stern 1949), leading to its recommendation to switch from a threshold to a linear model for cancer risk assessment (BEAR I 1956). The impact, therefore, of non-epistemic influences can be an important factor affecting science policy. Such non-epistemic drivers can be found in areas relating to political, ideological, economic, institutional, or even personal histories. The present article explores the impact of a non-epistemic driver (i.e., to enhance funding possibilities) on policy recommendations of the Genetics Panel of the NAS BEAR I Committee that led to the adoption of the LNT model for risk assessment.

New developments

The present communication is based on the recent discovery of a 2007 history of science dissertation by Seltzer that explored how self-interest may create biases with the potential to affect scientific judgments, policy recommendations, and public communications. Seltzer provided evidence that members of the Genetics Panel clearly saw their role in the NAS BEAR I Committee to be a vehicle to advocate and/or lobby for funding for radiation genetics (p. 285 footnote 208). Moreover, it was hoped that the committee, which would exist continuously over many years, would influence the direction and priorities for future research funding. According to Seltzer (2007), such hoped for funding possibilities for radiation geneticists can be seen in letter correspondence between Beadle, Dobzhansky,Footnote 1 Muller and Demerec. For example, Demerec (Demerec to Beadle 1957), the head of genetics at Cold Spring Harbor, offered a possible funding plan that could be accomplished by “setting aside a fund (let us say, one hundred million dollars), to be administered by some competent organization (such as the National Academy of Sciences) and used during a period of twenty or twenty-five years to fund already functioning research centers so as to attract and train first rate scientists” (Demerec to Beadle 1957). Dobzhansky reacted to Demerec’s proposal by indicating that he would “needless to say, be all in favor (of) $100,000,000 for research in general genetics….. but I would find it hard to keep a straight face arguing that they [general genetics] must be studied to evaluate the genetic effects of radiation on human populations” (Dobzhansky to Demerec 1957a). Demerec responded by saying that “I, myself, have a hard time keeping a straight face when there is talk about genetic deaths and the tremendous dangers of irradiation. I know that a number of very prominent geneticists, and people whose opinions you value highly, agree with me” (Demerec to Dobzhansky 1957). Dobzhansky to Demerec (1957b) responded by saying “Let us be honest with ourselves—we are both interested in genetics research, and for the sake of it, we are willing to stretch a point when necessary. But let us not stretch it to the breaking point! Overstatements are sometimes dangerous since they result in their opposites when they approach the levels of absurdity.

Now, the business of genetic effects of atomic energy has produced a public scare, and a consequent interest in and recognition of (the) importance of genetics. This is to the good, since it will make some people read up on genetics who would not have done so otherwise, and it may lead to the powers-that-be giving money for genetic research which they would not give otherwise.” (Dobzhansky to Demerec 1957b).

Seltzer (2007) concluded that such letters demonstrate that the geneticists were very concerned with the viability of their profession and they clearly recognized their “moment” in the government and public spotlight. They wanted to find a way to manipulate the current situation (i.e., to stretch a point) to enhance their opportunities for increased funding.

What could “stretching a point” mean within the context of the Genetics Panel? When the BEAR I Genetics Panel published their final report for the NAS (1956) and a detailed paper based on that report in the journal Science (BEAR I 1956), they were repeatedly emphatic that the dose–response for ionizing radiation in the genome was linear and that there was no safe dose (Table 1). In contrast, a letter from Demerec to Beadle (August 1, 1957) stated that “you will remember that on several occasions at meetings of our committee and in memoranda [(for example his written statements of January 24, 1956 (Demerec to Weaver 1956a) and February 11, 1956 (Demerec to Weaver 1956b) sent to Dr. Weaver (Chair of the BEAR I Genetics Panel)]…. I pointed out that our conclusions about the genetic effects of radiation would only be guesses until we acquired a great deal more basic information about genetic mechanisms….” Demerec then goes on to make his case for the one hundred million dollar genetics research fund as noted above. Thus, we see that Demerec of the Genetics Panel was willing to “stretch a point” with the grossly overstated confidence in the LNT-based recommendation while privately believing such “public certainties” were really “only guesses.” The August 1, 1957, letter of Demerec to Beadle was shared with the entire Genetics Panel. Written statements by other members of the BEAR I Genetics Panel also reinforced the perspective of Demerec. For example, in a letter to Chairman Weaver on February 3, 1956, Tracy M Sonneborn, University of Indiana (Sonneborn to Weaver 1956), stated “The committee is aware that, with the present lack of adequate quantitative data, it is not now possible to make a quantitatively correct calculation of the frequency of mutations induced in man by any given exposure to irradiations or to foresee exactly what the consequences would be in subsequent generations for any population in which any number of new mutations had been induced by irradiations or other means. These deficiencies in present knowledge are what make our task the formulation of a wise judgment instead of the computation of a precise calculation.” A similar view is seen in a February 20, 1956, letter of Alfred Henry Sturtevant (Sturtevant to Weaver 1956), California Institute of Technology, to Dr. Weaver in response to the Panel’s charge to estimate radiation damage to humans. He states that “After going through these calculations I come out with a feeling that they are rather futile. At almost every step it has been necessary to make a guess, often with little to go on, and with no real basis for setting limits within which the true value probably lies.” Gioacchino Failla (Failla to Weaver 1956) also noted that “…the available information is woefully insufficient to permit long range extrapolation to man, and opinions rather than scientific data must necessarily play a considerable part in any estimates made.”

Table 1 Low-dose linearity quotation in the journal Science from article summarizing the findings of the BEAR I Committee Genetics Panel (BEAR I 1956)
Full size table

The above letter exchanges are significant especially as these leading geneticists and members of the NAS BEAR Committee’s Genetics Panel revealed that their scientific and social goals were also entangled with their need to advance their research agenda and career success. It is also quite striking to read phrases like “finding it hard to keep a straight face” and a willingness to “stretch a point” all in the name of self-interest. Both phrases are indicative of a capacity and willingness to distort the truth to some degree for some self-serving purpose. This is an example of self-interest and how it operated among some radiation geneticists of the Genetics Panel as they made risk assessment recommendations that would change risk assessment policy worldwide. Such self-interest that was based on the promotion of their profession via the exaggeration of known risks may have affected their judgments in many ways, including their failure to vet the key LNT-supportive research findings of Curt Stern, and in the actions of some Genetics Panel members (e.g., Berwind P. Kaufmann) to censor key dose–response findings that clearly contradicted the LNT model ( 2011b, 2013). These types of biases are critical for they can affect the outcome of a committee’s recommendations.

In retrospect, therefore, a historical assessment of the LNT reflects the so-called “perfect toxicological storm”: Muller receiving the Nobel Prize within 1.5 years after the atomic bomb blasts in Japan, the deliberate deceptions of Muller on the LNT during his Nobel Prize lecture (Calabrese 2011a, 2012), the series of stealth-like manuscript manipulations and deceptions by Stern to generate scientific support for the LNT and to prevent Muller’s Nobel lecture deceptions from being discovered (Calabrese 2011b), the series of subsequent false written statements by Muller to support Stern’s papers and to protect his own reputation (Calabrese 2013), the misdirection and manipulation of the NAS Genetics Panel by the actions of Muller and Stern (Calabrese 2013), and now evidence of subversive self-interest within the membership of the Genetics Panel to exaggerate risk for personal gain. This series of Muller/Stern-directed actions inflamed societal fear of ionizing radiation following the bombings of Japan and during the extreme tensions of the cold war with its concomitant environmental contamination with radionuclides from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and led to the acceptance of the LNT model for cancer risk assessment by a human population that had become extremely fearful of radiation, even at very low doses.

Conclusion

It is time for regulatory agencies, the scientific community, legislative bodies, and the public to acknowledge these historical deceptions and their profound impact on the adoption of the LNT by the USA and other countries and to reassess the continuing use of the LNT in risk assessment.