Review of Economic Design

, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 83–94

Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns

Authors

    • Google, Inc
  • Kishore Papineni
    • Google, Inc
  • Sergei Vassilvitskii
    • Google, Inc
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0141-2

Cite this article as:
McAfee, R.P., Papineni, K. & Vassilvitskii, S. Rev Econ Design (2013) 17: 83. doi:10.1007/s10058-013-0141-2

Abstract

There are around 400 advertising networks that match opportunities for “display” advertising, which include banner ads, video ads and indeed all ads other than text-based ads, on web pages and candidate advertisements. This is about a \({\$}25\) billion business annually. The present study derives a method of pricing such advertisements based on their relative scarcity while ensuring that all campaigns obtain a reasonably representative sample of the relevant opportunities. The mechanism is well-behaved under supply uncertainty. A method based on the mechanism described in this paper was implemented by Yahoo! Inc.

Keywords

AdvertisingRepresentativenessMechanism designMarket designBiddingExchange

JEL Classification

D02M37

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013