Abstract
In Nigeria, politicians and parties have developed a sophisticated vote-buying scheme, which we label, according to the state, where it happens, the Ekiti model of vote buying. Through a qualitative study of the gubernatorial elections 2018 in Ekiti, we describe how the Ekiti model of vote buying works. At the top of this scheme are parties, which have developed a sophisticated money distribution chain. Party members, who participate, get rewards in forms of government jobs or other benefits (should the party win). At the bottom of the chain are the voters, who receive between 10 and 30 dollars for their vote. They can even double dip and get their voting money twice, if they play the system well. The staff at the voting stations and the security personnel also get their fair share to guarantee that the vote buying machinery works. Who wins in such a system of entrenched corruption? It is the party, which hands out the most resources. As such, the vote buying machinery proofed quite effective.
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Notes
Wu and Huang (2004) enumerate some various methods of vote buying used by vote brokers in Taiwan; these include the utilization of money and gifts, procuring voters’ documents, gambling on election outcome, removing loans, election dinners, raising workers’ income, and reimbursing voters’ tax fees (see also Canare et al. 2018).
Sometimes there are different levels of brokers. For example, Aspinall et al., (2017) report in their case study on Indonesia, that most candidates depend on their sub-district coordinators to select village coordinators, and the village coordinators to select base-level brokers.
For instance, according to Bratton (2008), 54 and 56% of the polled feared of becoming a victim of intimidation or violence in the 2003 and 2007 elections, respectively.
They also had the instruction to seize and keep (permanently) any money found on the opposition party chieftains. Special detention camps were mainly public primary or secondary schools premises and/or ‘friendly police stations where chieftains of APC and suspected moles within the PDP were incarcerated until after the election.
Returning officers are mostly highly ranked lecturers in federal universities who also worked as INEC’s ad-hoc staff in the election.
Van Ham and Lindberg (2015) come to similar conclusions. Studying 286 African elections from 1986 to 2012, they reveal that incumbents take to vote buying as an alternative to manipulation of the electoral process.
In total, we selected 7 respondent from each of the local government areas (i.e. 2 INEC Staff, 2 Corps Members, 1 PDP Chieftain, 1 APC Chieftain, 1 Police Officer) (Table 2)
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Amaechi, O.C., Stockemer, D. The working of electoral corruption: the Ekiti model of vote buying. Crime Law Soc Change 78, 105–123 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-10015-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-10015-w